Abstract. BIP70 is the Bitcoin payment protocol for communication between a merchant and a pseudonymous customer. McCorry et al. (FC 2016) showed that BIP70 is prone to refund attacks and proposed a fix that requires the customer to sign their refund request. They argued that this minimal change will provide resistance against refund attacks. In this paper, we point out the drawbacks of McCorry et al.'s fix and propose a new approach for protection against refund attacks using the Bitcoin multisignature mechanism. Our solution does not rely on merchants storing refund requests, and unlike the previous solution, allows updating refund addresses through email. We discuss the security of our proposed method and compare it with the previous solution. We also propose a novel application of our refund mechanism in providing anonymity for payments between a payer and payee in which merchants act as mixing servers. We finally discuss how to combine the above two mechanisms in a single payment protocol to have an anonymous payment protocol secure against refund attacks.
Introduction
Since the introduction of Bitcoin in 2008 [14] , it has been widely adopted by merchants as a payment method. By 2015, the number of merchants accepting Bitcoin was reported to surpass 100,000 [8] and it has continued to expand into new markets (see e.g. [10, 9] ). Bitcoin standards are developed through a process which involves a so-called (Standard Track) Bitcoin Improvements Proposal (BIP) being proposed, discussed, ratified, and adopted by the Bitcoin community. BIP70 [1] is the Bitcoin Payment Protocol standard that defines the communications between a pseudonymous customer and a merchant with a public key certificate. The protocol, provides a number of properties to improve the interaction between the two entities (e.g. allows the merchant's address to be human-readable) and also provides the necessary guarantees (e.g. a proof of This paper has been accepted to Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2018.
payment to the customer that can be used for dispute resolution). One important feature of the protocol is that the customer can specify refund addresses that will be used by the merchant in the case of refunds for cancelled orders or overpayments.
McCorry, Shahandashti and Hao however showed two refund attacks on the BIP70 protocol [13] . These attacks are referred to as the Silkroad Trader and Marketplace Trader attacks, and exploit the inadequacies of the refund mechanism in the standard, including for example the fact that the protocol only provides one-way authentication. In the Silkroad Trader attack, a malicious customer uses the refund mechanism to relay a payment to an illicit merchant (the Silkroad Trader) through an honest merchant. This is by simply declaring the Bitcoin address of the Silkroad Trader as the refund address, and later asking for a refund. McCorry et al. [13] discuss the steps required for the attack in detail and showed its feasibility by successfully carrying out the attack in real-life payment scenarios. The authors also described a second attack, called Marketplace Trader attack, in which a rogue trader plays the role of a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) between the customer and a reputable merchant and effectively direct the customer's payment to its own address after using the inadequate authentication of the protocol to change the refund address. In both these attacks, the analysis of blockchain data will not reveal the attacks. In McCorry et al.'s solution the customer signs the refund addresses by the public key they have used in the payment (the signature is called a proof of endorsement) and so effectively binds the refund addresses to the customer address. This prevents the first attack since the customer cannot deny their link to the Silkroad trader anymore. McCorry et al. [13] argue that this measure also discourages the second attack since merchants will become more reluctant to update the refund address through unauthenticated channels such as email.
McCorry et al.'s solution, although minimally changing the protocol, introduces a major data management challenge for the merchant. This is because protection against the Silkroad trader attack requires the merchant to maintain a database of the proofs of endorsement and transactions that are signed by the customer. These transactions include the refund information including the amount and the refundee address that the merchant must use, and the amount and address of the customer that the merchant has received the bitcoins from. Using the stored data, the merchant can "prove" that they have followed the customer's request and have not colluded with the customer in transferring money to the refundee (Silkroad Trader). We refer to this as an explicit log solution where all the relevant information must be stored and kept indefinitely by the merchant. The stored data are also privacy sensitive and so the merchant must adopt extra measures to secure the storage. The data must be kept in the database indefinitely as proof may become necessary at any time in the future. The database must be securely backed up (e.g. using cloud services) to ensure data is available when required.
Our contributions. We introduce implict logging that requires the merchant to only store a number of indexes to the blockchain that will be used to recover the required proof of innocence, when needed. The solution works as follows: a refund operation consists of two transactions produced by the merchant. The first transaction is a two output transaction with the refund amount that requires the signatures of the refundee and the customer to release the fund. The second transaction has the same value and is issued to the customer, with a time lock that allows the transaction to be released only after a specified time passes. The refundee requires the signature of the customer to receive their refund, which implies that they endorse the refund. If the customer does not endorse the refund (e.g. in the case of a Marketplace Trader attack), the first transaction will not be redeemed in time and hence the customer will be able to use the second (time-locked) transaction to redeem the bitcoins.
The merchant will store the indexes of the two transactions that are issued for a refund request, together with the indexes of the original payment transaction and the redeemed transaction. In the case of multiple refundees, all their details will be included in the first transaction and so the same amount of storage will be required.
The solution is robust in the sense that transactions that are associated with a refund and contain the proof of the relation between the customer and the refundee are kept on the blockchain and are immutable. If the database that contains the indexes of the transactions is corrupted, the merchant can still recover the information about the transactions that they have issued or received, by searching the blockchain for transactions that include their public key information. The solution preserves the privacy of the refund transaction against an adversary who has access to the blockchain and eavesdrops on the communication between the customer and the merchant, in the sense that the linkage between the customer and the refundee can only be revealed by the customer or the merchant. We will discuss how the scheme can be modified when there are more than one transaction issuers (this was considered by McCorry et al. ) . The details of this solution is given in Section 3.
We show that this solution also provides protection against Marketplace Trader attack without putting any restriction on BIP70. This is in contrast with McCorry et al.'s solution that requires the refund address not be accepted through email. This restriction is likely to be ignored in practice, rendering McCorry et al.'s solution icapable of preventing Marketplace Trader attacks.
In section 4 we consider a novel application of the refund mechanism in providing payment anonymity. The main observation is that refund addresses in Bitcoin can effectively provide a level of indirection that if carefully used, can decouple the payer and payee. In our proposal, the merchant provides a mixing service that allows the customers to pay for other services and to other merchants using a combination of overpayment and refund. By "mixing" transactions of multiple customers, the linkage of transactions using their payer and payee fields, as well as values, will be removed. We define the communication protocol between the customer and the mixing service based on BIP70. Finally, in Appendix A we discuss how the above two mechanisms can be combined to provide an anonymous payment protocol with security against refund attacks.
Preliminaries

The BIP70 Payment Protocol
BIP70 [1] is a Bitcoin application layer payment protocol that defines the sequence of messages communicated between a customer and a merchant. BIP70 consists of three messages: payment request, payment, and payment acknowledgment. It proceeds as follows.
After the customer selects an item from the merchant's website and clicks to pay, the merchant responds by sending a payment request message. This message contains payment details, the information related to merchant's X.509 certificate (PKI type and PKI data), as well as the signature of the merchant on the hash of the payment request. Here payment details consists of the Bitcoin address that the customer should send the bitcoins to, the time that request has been created, an expiration time, a memo containing notes to the customer, a payment URL, and finally the merchant data which is used by the merchant to identify the payment request.
The customer's Bitcoin wallet subsequently verifies the signature and the merchant's identity, the information in the payment details, such as the time of the request creation and expiry, displays the merchant's identity, the amount to pay, and the memo to the customer and asks the customer whether they want to continue. If confirmed, the wallet will create the necessary Bitcoin transactions for the payment and broadcast them to the Bitcoin peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Then, a payment message is sent to the merchant. This message consists of the merchant data from the payment details in payment request, one or more valid Bitcoin transactions, the refund to field which specifies a set of refund amount and address pairs to be used in case of a refund request, and a note for the merchant (memo).
When the merchant receives the payment message, it verifies that the transactions satisfy the payment conditions, broadcasts the transactions, and sends back a payment acknowledgment message. This message contains a copy of the payment message and a final memo including a note on the status of the transaction.
BIP70 does not specify how the payment request message should be downloaded, but requires that the payment and payment acknowledgment messages are communicated over a secure channel (such as HTTPS).
BIP70 does not explicitly define a refund protocol. It is implicitly assumed that if the customer requests a refund identifying the payment by the merchant data field, the merchant issues a refund transaction which sends the refund amounts to the corresponding refund addresses specified in the refund to field of the payment message. Figure 1 shows the communication flow in BIP70 and its implicit refund procedure. Note that besides communicating with each other, both the customer and the merchant are assumed have access to the Bitcoin P2P network. Both are able to broadcast transactions to the Bitcoin P2P network. Upon receiving a transaction, the Bitcoin P2P network decides whether to add the transaction into the distributed ledger (i.e. the Bitcoin blockchain) through the Bitcoin consensus mechanism. Both the customer and the merchant are also able to check whether their broadcasted transaction has been included in the blockchain. It is important to distinguish the communications in the application layer payment protocol and those in the P2P network. To simplify our diagrams, we do not explicitly show the P2P network communications.
Refund Attacks
McCorry et al. propose two attacks on the refund process of BIP70 [13] . These attacks work even if a secure channel such as HTTPS is used for communication between parties. We briefly describe these two attacks in the following.
Silkroad Trader attack. The refund addresses provided by the customer (in the refund to field) are in no way endorsed and can be repudiated at a later time. This means that a malicious customer may abuse the refund mechanism to relay their payment to an illicit trader (here called the Silkroad trader) through an honest merchant. The customer simply provides the illicit trader's address as the refund address to the merchant and thus when a refund is requested, the merchant will send the refund to the illicit Trader. The customer can later deny abusing the refund mechanism and the merchant will have no way to prove they have been cheated. Figure 2 shows the interaction among parties in this attack.
Marketplace Trader attack. Some merchants allow customers to specify new refund addresses upon a refund request. The customer requesting the refund is not authenticated. This means that any entity who has knowledge of the payment identifier (specified in the merchant data field of the payment details in the payment request message) can request a refund to any arbitrary account. This is the basis for the Marketplace Trader attack, in which a rogue trader acts as relaying man-in-the-middle for the payment request message between the merchant and the customer. Hence, the rogue trader is able to find out merchant data. At a later time, the rogue trader requests a refund to an arbitrary address and is able to steal the funds. Figure 3 shows the interactions among the parties in this attack.
McCorry et al.'s Solution to Refund Attacks
McCorry et al. propose to include in the payment message a "proof of endorsement" for refund addresses. To do this, each customer address involved in the payment protocol is required to produce a digital signature on (and therefore "endorse") a corresponding refund address. Employing this solution, at the end of a successful payment protocol, the merchant will be in possession of a proof of endorsement for each refund address. Such a proof can be presented and verified by a third party in case of a Silkroad Trader attack to implicate the malicious customer. Besides, since such a proof of endorsement is valuable for merchants, McCorry et al. argue that it will discourage merchants to accept new refund addresses unless accompanied by a proof of endorsement, resulting in reducing the possibility of Marketplace Trader attacks.
In McCorry et al.'s solution, for guaranteed protection against attacks, merchants will need to store payment transactions as well as payment requests and payment messages which are required to verify the proof of endorsement. Therefore, the actual storage overhead of McCorry et al.'s solution is much larger than only keeping proofs of endorsement. As noted earlier, maintaining a secure and robust database to store proof of endorsement messages is a security bottleneck of the system and can particularly become expensive for smaller merchants with limited resources.
Multisignature and Time-Locked Transactions in Bitcoin
Although it is convenient to think of Bitcoin transactions as sending funds to certain account addresses, technically what the transaction specifies is a set of redemption criteria in a certain script language. Any subsequent transaction which satisfies the redemption criteria may authorize the transfer of funds made available in the original transaction.
The most popular script is "Pay to Public Key Hash" (P2PKH), which requires a signature corresponding to an address, hence effectively sending the bitcoins to the address. Typical Bitcoin transactions use this script.
Another popular and more versatile script is "Pay to Script Hash" (P2SH), which requires satisfying a script, the hash of which is listed. P2SH can be used to implement a diverse range of transactions including multisignature transactions. A k-of-n multisignature transaction requires k signatures corresponding to k addresses within a set of n specified addresses to be present to redeem the funds in the transaction.
An interesting script which can be combined with the ones discussed above is one that effectively freezes the transaction funds until a time in the future to create a so-called time-locked transaction. The funds in a time-locked transaction cannot be spent by any other transaction until a certain (absolute or relative) time in the future.
We propose a solution to refund attacks that requires the merchant to store a fixed number of indexes (and so constant size) in each run of BIP70 protocol. The solution is robust to possible damages to database content, and ensures privacy of refund transaction from outsiders.
BIP70 requires the payment and payment acknowledgment to be sent over a secure channel, however does not specify such a requirement for the payment request message [1] . Therefore, in general we consider two types of attackers:
-Online attacker, intercepts the communication channel and sees all the input/output messages of a merchant; they also have access to blockchain data. -Offline attacker, has only access to the blockchain data.
To simplify our description, we first assume BIP70 communication is over HTTPS and so we only need to consider an offline attacker. We then show how to secure the protocol against an online attacker.
Our goal is to provide the following properties for the refund mechanism:
Implicit log. The merchant only stores indexes of transactions in a protocol run. This has the following advantages:
-Constant storage size per protocol run. The local storage size for a customer's payment in a protocol run is constant. -Robustness. The refund mechanism will work correctly and reliably in the case of a dispute, even if the merchant's local database is corrupted or lost. In the worst case when none of the locally stored indexes are accessible, the merchant can recover the required proofs by searching the blockchain using their own public key information.
Refund privacy. An offline adversary with access to the blockchain, or an online adversary with access to the blockchain and the communication link between the merchant and the customer, cannot reveal the linkage between the customer and the refundee. Note that BIP70 does not require secure communication between the customer and the merchant and so an online adversary can access unencrypted communication between the two. We note that the merchant's local database must be kept secure for customers' privacy.
We also aim to conform with BIP70 specifications and avoid extra restrictions including not accepting refund addresses by email. Note that Refund addresses are valid for two months from the time of the payment [1] , and during this period the customer should be allowed to change the refund addresses for example when an existing refundee has lost their wallet. Coinbase and Bitpay [7, 6] The proposed Refund mechanism, in which merchant locks the transaction to the customer and the refundee and they may redeem this transaction if they collaborate. The merchant also issues RefundTC2 for robustness to ensure that the refund can be unlocked by customer in case the first transaction is not redeemed.
Our Solution
Our proposed refund mechanism works as follows. The merchant creates a 2-of-2 multisignature transaction, and hence binds the refund amount to both the customer and refundee. Then, to make the protocol robust in case one of the addresses is not available, a second transaction is created. This second transaction is a time-locked transaction, and the customer is its only recipient. Merchant uses a lock time for this transaction to give priority to the first transaction. If the customer and the refundee could not collaborate to redeem the refund, the customer is able to claim them after the lock time. Note that the lock time creates a delay in the system only if the customer does not know the refundee, e.g. in the case of a Marketplace Trader attack. In other words, the second transaction is a backup for system robustness (see Figure 4) . In addition, to preserve refund privacy against offline attackers 3 the merchant deterministically creates fresh addresses from the public key of the customer and then masks them with a Diffie-Hellman key, generated using the fresh address of the customer and the private key of the merchant. This is to ensure that only the merchant or the customer who are able to re-generate the DiffieHellman key can discover the linkage between the refund key and the payment transaction. To derive fresh addresses we assume the customer has a deterministic wallet based on BIP32 [18] . Most Bitcoin wallets support BIP32 and so this is a reasonable assumption. In the rest of the paper, by deterministic wallet we mean a BIP32 wallet with a master key and key hierarchy (keys can be specified with an index).
Based on BIP32, a deterministic wallet generates a tree of public/private key pairs on elliptic curve E, e.g. for a 1-level tree, it creates 2 31 hardened and 2 31 non-hardened keys. Hardened keys are public keys for which the associated private keys can only be known before the generation of the public key. Nonhardened keys however allow anyone to derive a valid child public key from the parent public key, while the owner of the parent (master) private key can generate the respective child private key. In our protocol, the customer address in the payment transaction is a non-hardened public key which is used as a parent key by the merchant to derive child public keys. The customer knows the respective private keys and can also create the Diffie-Hellman key using the child private key and the public key of the merchant. Hardened keys can be used for refund addresses. The step by step process is given below:
Key generation. The customer wallet software generates a tree of public/private key pairs using BIP32 [18] . Each private key is an element of F q , where q = p n is a prime power. Each public key is a point on an elliptic curve E (specified for bitcoin) over F q . H l denotes the 256 leftmost bits of HMAC-SHA512 which is used for computing the child key; the rightmost bits of HMAC-SHA512 are used as the next level chain code. Let P k c = cP be a non-hardened public key. A child public key can be derived by anyone using this parent public key as follows: P k c = P k c + H l (ch c , P k c ||index)P ; where P k c is a child public key, P k c = c P , but only the customer who knows the parent private key can compute the child private key c . ch c denotes the chain code which is the 256 rightmost side of the parent hash, and index is the index of the generated child key in the tree. (P k c , ch c ) is called the extended pubic key (see [18] for details). We also use H * to denote a collision resistant hash function which maps a point on Elliptic curve E to F q , this is used for computing the Diffie-Hellman component in child keys as we describe it below. Click to pay. The customer visits the merchant website and chooses an item, then declares their intent to pay (e.g. by clicking a "pay" button). Payment request. The merchant sends the payment request including their public key, P k m = mP . This public key is unique for each transaction. Payment message. The customer after authenticating the merchant, puts together a payment transaction, MainTC, that transfers the cost of the chosen item to the merchant, and uses a non-hardened extended public key (with external chain) (P k c = cP, ch c ), as a data output (using the OP Return opcode). Finally, the customer creates a Payment message based on MainTC, and specifies their extended public key, n refund addresses, (P k r1 , P k r2 , . . . , P k rn ), and the amount of refund for each address. Payment ack. The merchant detects MainTC, and returns a PaymentAck message to the customer. Refund request. Within a 2 month period from the payment request [1] , the customer can use the addresses provided in Payment.refund to field to receive their refund. In this case, the merchant does the following:
1. Generates two new keys, P k m1 = m 1 P and P k m2 = m 2 P . 2. Derives child keys from the customer extended public key as described earlier, P k ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1. 3. Masks the child keys as P k ci = P k ci + H * (m 1 P k ci )P for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and P k ci = P k ci + H * (m 2 P k ci )P for i = n + 1. 4. Creates and broadcasts two transactions, RefundTC1 (in which the merchant's public key is P k m1 ) and RefundTC2 (in which the merchant's public key is P k m2 ). RefundTC1 is a P2SH transaction that can be redeemed by providing signatures from both P k ci and P k ri for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. RefundTC2 is a P2PKH transaction that can be redeemed by the private key corresponding to P k cn+1 after a specified lock time period (e.g. one week).
Protection against Silkroad Trader Attacks
In the Silkroad Trader attack, the customer wants to remove their link to the Silkroad Trader using a victim merchant. In our approach the refund transaction can be only redeemed if the customer and the refundee collaborate. Hence, the redemption of the refund transaction constitutes an evidence of the linkage between the customer and the refundee. This linkage, however, is hidden from those who observe the Bitcoin blockchain and so the merchant is the only one who knows this linkage. The merchant can prove that a payment transaction and a refund transaction are linked to each other by first deriving the child keys from the payment transactions and adding the respective Diffie-Hellman key (based on the public key of the merchant and the customer's child key) to them, then using the refundees' public key and the customer's masked child keys to create the P2SH address and show that it matches the address within the refund transaction; finally showing that the refund transaction has been redeemed by a pair of collaborating customer and refundee, thus establishing the evidence of the linkage. The merchant does not need to store the transactions in their database and the proofs are robustly preserved on the blockchain.
Protection against Marketplace Trader Attacks
If the customer provides a refund address during the BIP70 protocol run and later update it via email, the merchant just uses the newest refund address and locks the refund amount to both the refundee and the customer. If the customer and the refundee collaborate to redeem the refund, the refund is finalized; otherwise, if the rogue trader sends their own address to the merchant, they cannot later claim the bitcoins since the customer will not collaborate with an unknown refundee to sign the refund transaction. In case of such an attack, the customer will be able to claim the refund after the lock time expires. Thus, the approach protects the customer against Marketplace Trader attacks and at the same time provides the possibility to update the refund addresses.
Communication over HTTP
BIP70 does not restrict the customer and merchant to use HTTPS. Our proposed solution to refund attacks although by design hide the relation between the customer and the merchant, payment messages include information such as the refundee's address which can be used by an online attacker to find the corresponding refund transactions by searching the blockchain for the transactions that contain the address and so trace refundees transactions. To protect against these attacks, the customer may use HTTPS, or Diffie-Hellman key agreement on the merchant's public key and their own private key, to generate a key that will be used to encrypt sensitive messages such that they are decryptable by the merchant. Alternatively, merchant can follow the key generation algorithm of our scheme for both customers and refundees (for refundees derive child keys of the refund addresses and then mask them with Diffie-Hellman key on the refundees child key and their own private key). In this case refundee can still find the corresponding private key to claim the refund, but attacker cannot detect the refund transactions.
Analysis
In the following, we show how each of the mentioned properties will be satisfied. Implicit logging. A merchant may store information that are communicated during a payment protocol for various reasons, including bookkeeping, refund or exchange, or statistics about customers and products. Here we do not consider bookkeeping that is mainly for accounting purposes or the ability to honour refund or exchange policies. Nor we consider data storage that are for statistical analysis purposes. As noted in [13] , using the Bitcoin Payment Protocol requires the merchant to store evidence to protect them against refund attacks. This information must be kept for a sufficiently long time to be effective in providing such protection.
Consider a single run of the payment protocol. Transactions which are the "evidence for innocence" (of the merchant) are stored on the blockchain. The merchant must just store the transaction indexes, that is, the transaction ids (txid) of the MainTC, both the refund transactions RefundTC1 and RefundTC2, and Redeem transaction by which the customer (and possibly the refundee) redeem the refund. Table 1 shows a full refund record in the merchant's database. Each transaction index is 32 bytes and so 4 × 32 = 128 bytes are needed for the four transactions ids (MainTC, RefundTC1, RefundTC2, and Redeem transaction). Note that the merchant can always use a deterministic approach for the child key indexes, for example always start from index 0 and increment it for each new child key, and so they do not need to be stored. It is not difficult to see that storage size is independent of the number of refundees. In the case of a dispute, the merchant can retrieve all the mentioned transactions from the blockchain using their stored transaction ids, and then use the chain code, index, and the public key of the customer, to derive the related child key, and use their own private key m i , i = 1, 2, to re-create the masked address, P k c = P k c + H * (m i P k c )P . If the output of the P2PKH transaction with address P k c is a spent output, it indicates that the customer has redeemed the refund without the collaboration of the refundee. If the redeemed transaction is the P2SH transaction, P k c and the refund addresses in the Redeem transaction are used to re-generate the P2SH address. If the address matches the RefundTC2 and it is a spent output we know that the owner of the masked child public key P k c (or more precisely the owner of the public key P k c ) and refundee have collaborated with each other to redeem the refund.
Minimal storage size. In the following we compare the storage cost of our proposed protocol with that of McCorry et al. [13] . The comparison summary can be found in Table 2 . In McCorry et al.'s solution, the proof of endorsement is a signature that must be locally stored. Verification of this signature requires information about the main transaction and the communicated messages including the refund addresses, refund values, the memo from the customer, and the payment request message. The merchant also needs to store the transaction ids for both the payment and refund transactions. Let L S denote the size of the proof of endorsement signature. The size of a transaction input with one signer is at least 146 bytes 4 . Other values are, refund address which is 34 bytes, refund value which is 8 bytes, memo and payment request message sizes are denoted by L pay and can reach 50,000 bytes. Finally a transaction id is 32 bytes. Thus in total, for one refundee, 252 + L S + L pay bytes must be stored at the merchant side and this cost grows linearly with the number of refundees. The total storage for n refundees will be 210 + 42n + L S + L pay bytes which is significantly higher than our scheme. Note that we are not considering the size of the merchants' keys in our calculations. Table 2 . Storage size (in bytes) of our approach vs. [13] Scenario
McCorry et al. [13] Our approach 1 refundee 252 + LS + Lpay 128 n refundees 210 + 42n + LS + Lpay 128
Robustness. The payment protocol must work correctly in case of a dispute or when the information stored in the merchant's database is corrupted or lost. In [13] , if the local database that stores the signature (proof of endorsement) is corrupted, the evidence of the collusion will be irreversibly lost and the merchant will become vulnerable to refund attacks. In our proposed approach however the merchant can exhaustively search on all their keys to retrieve the database records. To do so, the merchant re-generates all the private/public keys using their wallet (through the master key) and then uses a blockchain explorer (e.g. blockchain.info) to search for the transactions that contain these public keys. We denote the search complexity on blockchain with O S . Assuming the number of keys used by the merchant to be 2 k , the search complexity becomes 2 k O S . The retrieved transactions are then identified as MainTC, RefundTC1, and RefundTC2 based on their types and the merchant role as a sender or receiver of each transaction. If the merchant is the recipient, the transaction is MainTC. If the merchant is the sender and the transaction is P2SH, it is RefundTC1, otherwise if the merchant is the sender and the transaction is P2PKH, the transaction is RefundTC2. Redeem transactions are also found by searching the output addresses in RefundTC1 and Refund TC2. If the number of these transactions is the search complexity increases to 2 k . .O S . After this classification, the merchant can follow the steps below to retrieve the database:
1. The merchant chooses one specific MainTC transaction and stores its index in the database. 2. To find the related refund transactions, the merchant should reconstruct the masked child key of the customer P k c . First, merchant generates the child key of the customer, P k c , using the chain code stored in MainTC (for the index, merchant can always try the first index, i.e. pick index 0 and 1). Then, they mask the child key with the Diffie-Hellman component, H(m i P k c )P to generate P k c . For this, the merchant should try all the private keys m i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 k . -If P k c matches the key inside RefundTC2, the used index is stored in the database as RefundTC2 txid. If this transaction is a spent transaction, merchant stores the corresponding Redeem transaction index in the database and halts, since the proof is fully retrieved and customer have spent the transaction alone. -Otherwise, Ref undT C1 may have been spent, so the merchant uses P k c to find the corresponding Redeem transaction and uses the refund keys in that transaction to reconstruct the P2SH address. The corresponding RefundTC1 is the one which contains the mentioned P2SH address. The index of this transaction is stored in the database and the proof is fully retrieved. -However, if Redeem transaction for a specific customer does not exist at all, it shows that customer has not redeemed the refund value yet, hence the merchant should wait for the customer to claim the refund and subsequently retrieve the database record.
The complexity of reconstruction depends on the number of keys the merchant has used, the key generation, the search operation, and the number of refund transactions. If key generation (calculating the point arithmetic and hashing related to masked child key) takes O K , and the total number of customers is t, then the total complexity is upper bounded by 2 k (2tO K + O S ). The factor 2 for O K is because we should follow this procedure for both refund transactions RefundTC1 and RefundTC2.
Privacy. To show that our scheme guarantees privacy, that is, only the merchant and the customer can reveal the linkage between the customer and the refundee, we consider two types of attackers: online attackers and offline attackers. Since an online attacker has access to both the communication channel and the blockchain, and hence is stronger, we only provide the justification for privacy for an online attacker. Privacy against offline attackers who only have access to the blockchain is straightforward.
Suppose that the channel is not TLS-protected (worst case), so the online attacker can intercept all the communicated messages between the customer and the merchant. Through PaymentRequest and Payment message, the attacker discovers the public key of the merchant P k * m , the extended public key of the customer (ch * c , P k * c ) , and the public key of the refundee P k * r . The goal of the attacker is to link the customer address P k * c in MainTC to the refund address P k * r . For simplicity we assume that RefundTC1 and Redeem transaction is also given to the attacker; this simulates the case where the refundee is the attacker. In practice this assumption may not be true, and the attacker needs to also guess the transactions. Overall, the attacker observes the information given in Table 3 . From Redeem transaction, the attacker can link the customer address P k c to P k * r . The reason is that to claim the bitcoins both the customer and the refundee need to sign the Redeem transaction. Hence, a spent refund transaction shows that the customer with P k c knows the refundee with P k * r . Thus, to link the customer P k * c to refundee P k * r , the attacker needs to just find whether P k c is derived from P k * c . P k c is generated as follows P k c = P k c +H * (m * 1 c P )P , where P k c is the child key derived from the customer address P k c = P k * c + H l (ch * c , P k * c ||index)P . The attacker knows P k * c and ch * c , so they can guess P k c by trying different indexes with probability 1 n , assuming the number of refundees is n. To link the child key P k c to P k c , the attacker needs to solve the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) given m * 1 c P , P k * m1 = m * 1 P , and P k c = c P . Since solving DDH is hard (say with representing the probability of solving DDH), the attacker's probability of success will be P success = n which is negligible. possibly reveal user identities. There have been a number of approaches for providing anonymity [17, 11, 12, 3] . Stealth address schemes [17] guarantee address anonymity against an online attacker who intercepts the communication link and sees the Bitcoin address of the payee when it is sent to payer to create the transaction. By stealth address technique, payer adds a Diffie-Hellman key to the payee's address in a way that the corresponding private key is still known by payee. In CoinSwap [12] a party uses an intermediary node to send the payment to payee; the goal is anonymity against online attacker. In CoinJoin [11] a number of parties agree to create one transaction together, they also use values with equal worth to provide value anonymity against an offline attacker. In Fair Exchange [3] two people exchange their bitcoins with each other to achieve coins with a history that is unrelated to them, to resist against an offline attacker. Each of these solutions can be considered as a traditional mixing service. Users can also mix their coins through a mix server (e.g. bitmixer.io [5] ), which receives their coins and pay them back a fresh coin, although mixer receives a fee from the user. This technique, however has a problem, user should trust the mix server that they will not steal their money.
Refund mechanism provides a level of indirection that can be used for adding anonymity to Bitcoin users. We propose to use merchants as a trusted mixing servers by using a modified BIP70 protocol refund's policy. To use this service, the customer visits the website of a merchant and selects an item for purchase. By using overpayment and the recipients' addresses as the refund addresses, the sender can send payment to refundees in an anonymous way. Alternatively, they can send the desired amount to the merchant and later cancel their order for the refund. In these situations, merchant acts as an intermediary to allow the customer to pay the bitcoins to the recipients indirectly. Merchant can also split the value to smaller chunks and mix the refund transactions of different entities to provide value and time anonymity respectively. Reputable merchants are generally trusted and are expected to follow the protocol. Note that the merchant does not know if the refundee in a refund transaction is a customer and cannot relate the output bitcoin addresses to the user. Merchants can benefit for such service by requesting a fee for it.
In our proposed protocol, the merchant receives inputs from customers' transaction, and issues transaction with outputs based on the addresses in the Payment.refund to field. Refund addresses are extended public keys of refundees. Merchant generates child keys of the respective refund addresses, split the values of refund to smaller equal chunks and sends the partitioned values to child keys. Merchant considers the refund address as a parent key and uses its child keys for refund transactions to have a fresh address for each chunk. To provide confidentiality for the parent refund key (this is needed because we assume online attacker exists and the communication is HTTP), the merchant encrypts the child keys using the Diffie-Hellman key generated by the public key of the merchant and the private key of the customer. For secure mixing, the time relationship between the input and the output of the mix must be protected. Otherwise an adversary who intercepts the merchant's channel can link the two using the time information of the merchant input and output. In the following protocol the merchant mixes the refunds of different customers and hides the time relation between inputs and outputs of the mix service.
Key generation. We assume that Refundee is using BIP32 [18] wallets, and sends their extended public key to the customer. Customer generates a private/public key pair as P k c = cP . Click to pay. The customer visits the merchant website and chooses an item, then clicks on "pay". Payment request. The merchant sends the payment request message including their public key, P k m = mP . This public key is unique for each transaction. Payment message. After authenticating the merchant, the customer picks a public key, P k c , and generates MainTC which pays the cost of the chosen item to Merchant. Then, the customer creates a payment message with extended refund keys, (P k ri , ch ri ), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, for n refund addresses, and the amount of refund value for each; then encrypts the Payment.refund to field using Diffie-Hellman key H * (cP k m ) (this is not required if channel is TLS-protected). Payment ack. The merchant detects MainTC, decrypts the refund addresses, and returns an acknowledgement message, PaymentAck, to customer. Refund request. Within a predetermined distance from payment request (can be defined in Payment.refund to field), customer can use the addresses provided in refund to field to receive the refund. In this case, the merchant 1. Splits each refund value (for different customers) to k partition; for example, v 1 is divided to v 11 , v 12 , . . . v 1k , and v 2 to v 21 , v 22 , . . . v 2k and so on. The goal is to have equal amounts. 2. Derives child keys of each refund address, P k rij ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ k. 3. Creates a few transactions. For each child key merchant creates an output that pays its chunk of refund value to the corresponding masked child key P k rij = P k rij + H * (m * P k rij ), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ k. While mixing the outputs of different customers in each transaction, the merchant broadcasts the transactions to the Bictoin network.
Discussion
Our approach is relatively similar to CoinJoin [11] . CoinJoin has two versions; in the first version users should agree and join to create one transaction. Because this co-joined transaction mixes inputs and outputs of different users, an offline attacker can not distinguish the relation between them, provided that the inputs are all in the same range. In the second version of CoinJoin, users trust a third party who mixes the input and outputs of different users and create one transaction, and sends it back to each user to sign. In this procedure, the third party learns the relation between inputs and outputs and IP addresses of the users. This approach cannot protect against online attackers who intercept the communication channels. To hide the IP address from online attackers, Tor or VPN must be used [11] .
In our scheme, customers start a normal purchase from a merchant, and send the excess transferred amount, or alternatively the whole payment, to the refundee through merchant. First of all, it should be noted that refund request can be sent via a different communication channel such as email (by providing payment acknowledgment), so an online attacker is not able to see the refund request. Second, an online attacker can never be assured that the customers have really made a purchase or not, or even which item they have bought, since it is possible to make overpayments to hide the exact amount of payment. Third, in CoinJoin the final transaction consists of output addresses who have been introduced by the owner of input addresses, meaning that everyone knows that the output address has a relation with one of the inputs (possibly ownership), and even the values in the input and output can leak information about the links between input and output addresses. In our scheme the merchant creates the refund transaction using a different address from the one used in the MainTC, and so the link between the customer's first transaction (MainTC) and the refund transaction (RefundTC) is removed. Additionally, any relation between the inputs and outputs in the sense of time, value, and address are taken off and a global passive attacker who monitors communication links and the blockchain cannot obtain any information (see Figure 5 ). Fourth, merchants will not be able to steal the bitcoins of the customers because of their reputation. This feature is necessary for any indirect payment; in CoinSwap [12] , which is also an indirect payment method, first a commitment transaction is created to impede theft and then the transfer is done. But in our scheme even if the merchant does not deliver the bitcoins to the refundee, the customer can present their payment acknowledgement message to a judge and prove the theft. Effectively, using the merchant as a mixing server extends the search space for linking transactions and ensures a higher anonymity compared to CoinJoin. Alice pays the bitcoins to merchant, and introduces Carol and Elena as refundees, through BIP70. Bob also pays the bitcoins to merchant and introduces David as refundee. Merchant creates a few refund transactions and mixed their outputs and send them to refundees.
